China is confronting significant disruption to its Iranian crude oil supply, risking both its energy security and geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East. With over 90 per cent of Iran’s oil exports directed to China via Kpler, the contraction of that flow places Beijing’s $400 billion 2021 cooperation deal in jeopardy.
Major Chinese independent refiners, the so‑called “teapots” in Shandong province, are enduring mounting losses as deepening discounts on Iranian oil clash with soaring global prices. Discounts have widened to between $3.30 and $3.50 a barrel against ICE Brent for July cargoes – up from approximately $2.50 in June – contributing to refinery utilisation dropping to around 51 per cent, down from 64 per cent a year ago.
Despite Israel’s airstrikes targeting Iranian energy infrastructure and concerns over potential U.S. sanctions, Iran has maintained its exports through a shadow tanker fleet and strategic logistics adjustments. Kpler reports that crude loadings have reached a five‑week high of about 2.2 million barrels per day, assisted by the use of a less exposed jetty on Kharg Island and pre‑positioning of floating stocks nearer to China – including approximately 8 million barrels stationed offshore China.
In 2024, Iranian shipments to China peaked at 1.6 million barrels per day, but that volume had already declined to roughly 740,000 bpd by April 2025, as broader Middle East instability and tightening sanctions exerted pressure. Rival supplies from OPEC+ producers like Saudi Arabia and the UAE may partially compensate, yet analysts emphasise that prolonged disruption would still erode Beijing’s strategic leverage and diplomatic role in the region.
For China, this dependence on Iranian crude is part of a broader ambition to deepen its influence across the Middle East as a counterweight to the West. The initial rationale behind the 25‑year deal encompassed energy security, infrastructure projects, trade expansion, and regional diplomacy. But the conflict’s escalation threatens those objectives, undermining China’s established pipeline for cheap oil and complicating its efforts to mediate regional tensions.
Economists note the urgency for Beijing to accelerate its shift toward renewable energy and domestic self-reliance. China had already reached a milestone with renewables comprising 56 per cent of its electricity capacity in 2024. The current moment has intensified calls to reduce external vulnerabilities and accelerate electrification.
At present, the Chinese government has refrained from military engagement, calling for de-escalation and abstaining from direct intervention in support of Iran. Instead, it is pursuing regional diplomacy while guarding its considerable investments. A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson emphasised the need to “prevent the region from spiralling into greater turmoil”, particularly to secure stable energy imports.
However, should the conflict deepen, or if key Iranian oil infrastructure suffers irreparable damage, China’s reliance on opaque supply routes and shadow trading may no longer suffice. Its medium‑term strategy of presenting itself as a credible peace broker in the Middle East faces growing strain amid diverging interests between Iran and Gulf states.
China appears poised to rely more heavily on Gulf crude, yet that reliance comes with its own geopolitical calculations. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi together hold significant spare capacity – over 4 million barrels per day – which may cushion global shocks but do little to salvage China’s ambition to sustain influence via energy partnerships.
The unfolding developments in the Israel–Iran arena have exposed strategic fissures in a partnership that once appeared unshakeable. Even as Iran adapts tactically to maintain its export pipeline to China, Beijing must confront the reality that maintaining influence in the region demands resilience beyond discounted barrels and shadow fleets.
